: When two causes combine to cause damage and either alone would have caused the damage, both are liable as long as both were a substantial factor in causing the damage.
: Defendant is liable for all physical injuries even if another plaintiff wouldn't have suffered those injuries.
False imprisonment is the direct restraint of one person of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification.
To be liable for negligence by omitting something, it has to be something that a reasonable person would have done.
Bell's: Must be reasonable in average circumstances.
If a defendant reasonably believed the plaintiff had unlawfully taken goods for sale in defendant's store, then he has a privilege to detain plaintiff for a reasonable investigation of the facts once plaintiff has left the premises.
Medical professionals can be held liable for malpractice if they do something that violates the recognized standard of good medical practice in the community.
Page 177The policy basis of holding a permanently insane person liable for his tort is:
- Where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it should be borne by the one who occasioned it;
- to induce those interested in the estate of the insane person (if he has one) to restrain and control him; and
- the fear an insanity defense would lead to false claims of insanity to avoid liability.
Ordinary care is needed to not be liable for a resulting injury.
It is the duty of people keeping barrels in warehouses to keep them from rolling out. Failure to do so is negligence on the face.
Public benefit must outweigh public danger.
Attorneys are not liable to third parties.
Unforeseeable illness is not actionable negligence.
Bell's: To be liable for an action, it has to be a volitional act.
People generally do not have a duty to warn or protect others from the criminal acts of a third person, especially when assaultive.
Page 440, Paragraph 4–5Such a duty can exist when a special relationship exists between the defendant and either the plaintiff or the criminal actor. "Certain special relationships such as that of a common carrier/passenger, innkeeper/guest, and employer/employee impose a duty to warn when the danger of third party criminal acts is known or reasonably foreseeable. In instances, however, where the special relationship was that of a business owner/invitee or landlord/tenant, we have imposed a duty to warn of third party criminal acts only where there was an "imminent probability of injury" from a third party criminal act."
Page 84One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor of the chattel if, but only if,
- he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or
- the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or
- the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or
- bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.
One cannot be held liable for negligence for actions motivated by a serious threat of bodily injury or death.
Establishes the Sudden Emergency Doctrine.
No, res ipsa loquitur cannot hold someone liable for a defect he did not cause and was not expected to know of.
Page 471, Paragraph 6
Statistically evidence must show that the risk of the damage more than doubled to satisfy the "but for" test.
One must fail to exercise ordinary care to be liable for negligence.
Drivers must be aware of the flaws and faults that would be noticed by a reasonable inspection.
Bell's: The person whose conduct is being evaluated is deemed to have the knowledge that the ordinary prudent person would have.
Page 345, Paragraph 7When a third person intervenes between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence. If the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct, it may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal nexus.
Every unauthorized entrance into the close of another is a trespass.
Parents cannot recover for the wrongful death of their unborn child.
Offspring of DES victims cannot hold the manufacturers strictly liable if they did not have exposure themselves.
Page 50, Paragraph 4[A] claim for false arrest will not lie if an officer has a valid warrant or probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person who was arrested committed it.
: Conviction of the crime arrested for is a defense for false imprisonment.
: Touching an item is considered touching the person if he is holding or otherwise in intimate contact with the item.
An act of suicide is generally a superseding cause.
Defendant must know with substantial certainty that harmful contact will occur.
: Intent exists when the defendant acts with knowledge that there is a substantial certainty that the outcome (here, a harmful contact) would occur.
In an action for negligence, a plaintiff must produce evidence from which it can be reasonably inferred that negligent conduct on the part of the defendant or its agents was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Page 80, Paragraph 3.The law in regard to a trespass to chattels is thus summarized in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, s. 218: "one who without consensual or other privilege to do so, uses or otherwise intentionally intermeddles with a chattel which is in possession of another is liable for a trespass to such person if,
- the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality or value, or
- the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or
- bodily harm is thereby caused to the possessor or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest."
: There has to be evidence that the hazard had been on the platform long enough that defendant should have known and removed it.
To prove negligence of someone's mode of operation, one must prove:
When a water company contracts with a city to supply water, they are not liable to any third-party plaintiff to supply water.
Consent to one violent activity does not give implied consent to violence done outside the bounds of the activity.
The two key elements of false imprisonment are the restraint of an individual against his will and the unlawfulness of such restraint. The individual may be restrained by acts or merely by words which he fears to disregard.
Page 63[F]our elements . . . must coalesce to impose liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress:
- The conduct must be intentional or reckless;
- The conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
- There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress;
- The emotional distress must be severe.
A professional is held to the objective minimum standard of care applicable to all of that profession.
If one starts to rescue, he has a duty to act like a reasonably prudent person would.
One's land rights extend up to an indefinite extent.
Page 286, Paragraph 2. . . once a plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant's acts or omission have increased the risk of harm to another, such evidence furnishes a basis for the jury to make a determination as to whether such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in bringing about the resultant harm.
Where separate acts of negligence combine to produce directly a single injury each tortfeasor is responsible for the entire result
Defendants were justified in taking back their property but not in using force to do so except in response to plaintiff's aggression. If defendants' force was in response to plaintiff's resistance and not unnecessarily violent, they were justified.
Lawyers who act in good faith and an honest belief that their advice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of their clients are not liable for mere errors of judgment or mistakes in points of law not yet settled by a court of last resort in his state and on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers. They are liable for damages resulting from a lack of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by other attorneys.
People are liable for harms even if accidental.
The apprehension itself is a harm, even if physical damage was not done.
Defendants are liable for all harm they directly cause as long as some harm is reasonably foreseeable.
Page 449, Paragraph 2When the the empirical evidence and common experience indicate that one may have actual knowledge or special reason to know that his spouse is abusing or is likely to abuse an identifiable victim, it is considered reasonably foreseeable.
: A duty to warn may exist based on particular knowledge or a special reason to know of the particular type of injury towards a reasonably identifiable victim.
Employers, drivers, caretakers (of prisoners/hospital patients), spouses
For res ipsa loquitur, the harm must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant
When the "operating methods" present a continuous or easily foreseeable danger, notice is not needed for an individual event thereof.
Defendant must have received constructive notice of a dangerous condition.
No, an owner may not shoot a person in an unoccupied house via a spring gun.
Majority rule
Some states modify the rule if defendant warned plaintiff of danger.
A host who serves liquor to an adult social gust, knowing that the guest is intoxicated and that he will thereafter be driving, is liable for injuries inflicted by the guest as a result.
Where the issue lies wholly beyond the range of the experience or observation of laymen and of which they can have no appreciable knowledge, court and juries must of necessity depend upon and accept the undisputed testimony of reputable specialists.
Page 445, Paragraph 1[T]here may be a legal obligation to take positive or affirmative steps to effect the rescue of a person who is helpless or in a situation of peril, when the one proceeded against is a master or invitor, or when the injury resulted from use of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant. Such an obligation may exist although the accident or original injury was cause by the negligence of the plaintiff or through that of a third person and without any fault on the part of the defendant.
: Where defendant controls the instrumentality causing the injury, defendant has a duty to rescue. Special relationships that involve duty to rescue require the defendant to have actual ability and authority to control the third-person.
Plaintiff must prove:
Some objects are and some are not intrinsically dangerous enough to make on liable for leaving them accessible.
Page 429, BottomIf the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.
Adds "unexcused" omission
Res ipsa loquitur allows a common sense inference of negligence if coupled with a sufficient showing of its immediate, precipitating cause.
Res ipsa loquitur may rarely apply when the facts show that the accident would not have usally occurred had the defendant not been negligent.
: Mental illness does not negate intent for intentional torts.
Consent to one surgery is not consent to that surgery in another location, even if it helps.
Page ???
- A physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional judgment.
- A physician's failure to disclose such interests may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.
Cases must be judged on a national standard of care.
Consent is viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a hazard existed long enough for the business owner to receive constructive notice.
Violation of a statute that is for the protection or benefit of others constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence.
A defendant is liable for a risk that does not have a disadvantage to preventing it, no matter how small the risk is.
A person is only liable for harms resulting from reasonably foreseeable risks that made the actor's conduct tortious.
Defendants are not liable for harm to unforeseeable victims.
Page 46, Top[T]here is no liability for intentionally confining another unless the person physically restrained knows of the confinement or is harmed by it.
Page 87, Paragraph 4The Restatement (Second) of Torts has marked the distinction by defining conversion as: ". . . [A]n intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." Less serious interferences fall under the Restatement's definition of trespass [to chattels].
Page 87, Paragraph 5
: There must be complete of very substantial deprivation of possession rights.
Causation must be shown for liability.
A series of factors determines tort liability based off statute violations:
When the actions of a passenger are foreseeably dangerous, the driver has a duty to his passengers and/or the public to prevent harm from occurring as a result.
Standards of prudent conduct are declared at time by courts, but they are taken over from the facts of life.
Extraordinary situations may not be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal.
: Cause of action by parent or child based on negligent medical treatment that deprives parents of the option to terminate the pregnancy to avoid the birth of a defective child.
: Good faith mistakes do not negate intent for intentional torts.
Where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of accident to the plaintiff and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened withotu the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect between the negligence and the injury.
Disabled people have the same standard of care as abled people.
The reasonably prudent person has the same physical characteristics as the defendant.
A child should be held to the standard of a reasonable child of their age unless the activity is a dangerous one, in which case, it should be that of an adult.
: A privilege to enter land may be limited by time, space, or purpose.
The damages incurred must be the immediate result of the negligence of the defendants.
A physician has a duty to disclose all material risks of the procedure.
When a risk is open to debate as to whether it must be disclosed, it is a matter for the fact-finder to determine.
This does not apply when the patient should know the risks, when it would detrimental for the patient to know the risks, or in emergency situations.
A patient's medical malpractice action must show:
- Defendant physician failed to inform him adequately of a material risk before securing his consent to the proposed treatment;
- If he had been informed of the risks he would not have consented to the treatment;
- The adverse consequences that were not made known did in fact occur and he was injured as a result of submitting to the treatment.
When a group of defendants produce a substantial share of the market share of a drug, they may be held liable for harms resulting therefrom for their approximate portion of market share when the specific manufacturer is unknown.
This is called market share liability.
This usually only applies to DES cases.
: The privilege of justification is a generic term for a defense to a tort in circumstances where it would be unfair to hold defendant liable when no traditional defense applies.
Restatement § 46 makes a blanket provision for liability on the part of "one, who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another." Intention exists "when the act is done for the purpose of causing the distress or with knowledge . . . that severe emotional distress is substantially certain to be produced by [such] conduct."
Page 59, Paragraph 2Language must be likely to cause "severe emotional distress," not mere "emotional distress."
Conduct must be outrageous.
The test is: Is it so severe that a person of ordinary sensibilities suffer intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Some acts come with strict liability for resulting harms.
A violation of a statute or regulation constitutes negligence as a matter of law when the violation results in injury to a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the legislation and when the harm is of the kind which the statute or regulation was enacted to prevent.
Page 55, Paragraph 5
Physical damage is a prerequisite to recover for economic loss.
When a driver causes an accident by going off the road without apparent cause and causes harm, the normal inference is negligence, and res ipsa loquitur is usually held to apply.
: Where both act negligently but only one is liable, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.
Yes, a house may be destroyed to prevent a fire from spreading when it is necessary like here.
Intent transfers between people and between the five trespass torts.
Where the defendant and the criminal actor have a special relationship and the harm is reasonably foreseeable, the defendant may have an affirmative duty for the benefit of third persons.
[A] cause of action is established when it is shown that one, in the absence of any privilege, intentionally subjects another to the mental suffering incident to serious threats to his physical well-being, whether or not the threats are made under such circumstances as to constitute a technical assault.
Page 481, Bottom[A] plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, said plaintiff:
- is closely related to the injury victim;
- is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and
- as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.
Negligence must be judged by the defendant's conduct under all the circumstances.
One is liable if the likely harm outweighs the burden of adequate precautions.
Prudence must be judged as being that of a reasonable man.
Yes, plaintiff is liable for damage he does to defendant by leaving his ship moored during a storm.
Battery only requires the contact to be intended, not the resulting harm.
Page 351, Paragraph 2[I]f the intervening agency is something so unexpected or extraordinary as that he could not or ought not to have anticipated it, he will not be liable
: If defendant's negligence created a foreseeable risk that a third person would commit a crime or intentional tort, defendant's liability will not be cut off by that crime or intentional tort.
Defendants might not be liable for accidental harms.
An assault can be committed as long as the defendant "create[s] in the mind of the [plaintiff] a well-founded fear of an imminent battery coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt, if not prevented."
For false imprisonment, the restraint must be physical, but physical impediments are physical.
A tort action based on an injury resulting from violation of a contract cannot be upheld if plaintiff was not a party to the contract.
The conduct leading to a harm must be a reasonably foreseeable result of a defendant's actions for him to proximately liable for an injury caused by the resulting conduct.
Violation of statute merely establishes a rebuttable presumption of negligence.