If a defendant reasonably believed the plaintiff had unlawfully taken goods for sale in defendant's store, then he has a privilege to detain plaintiff for a reasonable investigation of the facts once plaintiff has left the premises.
People generally do not have a duty to warn or protect others from the criminal acts of a third person, especially when assaultive.
Page 440, Paragraph 4–5Such a duty can exist when a special relationship exists between the defendant and either the plaintiff or the criminal actor. "Certain special relationships such as that of a common carrier/passenger, innkeeper/guest, and employer/employee impose a duty to warn when the danger of third party criminal acts is known or reasonably foreseeable. In instances, however, where the special relationship was that of a business owner/invitee or landlord/tenant, we have imposed a duty to warn of third party criminal acts only where there was an "imminent probability of injury" from a third party criminal act."
[W]here a definite and objective physical injury is produced a result of emotional distress proximately caused by proved action may recover in damages for such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock.
Page 345, Paragraph 7When a third person intervenes between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence. If the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct, it may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal nexus.
In an action for negligence, a plaintiff must produce evidence from which it can be reasonably inferred that negligent conduct on the part of the defendant or its agents was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
The law in regard to a trespass to chattels is thus summarized in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, s. 218: "one who without consensual or other privilege to do so, uses or otherwise intentionally intermeddles with a chattel which is in possession of another is liable for a trespass to such person if,
the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality or value, or
the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or
bodily harm is thereby caused to the possessor or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest."
The two key elements of false imprisonment are the restraint of an individual against his will and the unlawfulness of such restraint. The individual may be restrained by acts or merely by words which he fears to disregard.
. . . once a plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant's acts or omission have increased the risk of harm to another, such evidence furnishes a basis for the jury to make a determination as to whether such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in bringing about the resultant harm.
Defendants were justified in taking back their property but not in using force to do so except in response to plaintiff's aggression. If defendants' force was in response to plaintiff's resistance and not unnecessarily violent, they were justified.
Lawyers who act in good faith and an honest belief that their advice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of their clients are not liable for mere errors of judgment or mistakes in points of law not yet settled by a court of last resort in his state and on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers. They are liable for damages resulting from a lack of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by other attorneys.
Page 449, Paragraph 2When the the empirical evidence and common experience indicate that one may have actual knowledge or special reason to know that his spouse is abusing or is likely to abuse an identifiable victim, it is considered reasonably foreseeable.
Bell: A duty to warn may exist based on particular knowledge or a special reason to know of the particular type of injury towards a reasonably identifiable victim.
Where the issue lies wholly beyond the range of the experience or observation of laymen and of which they can have no appreciable knowledge, court and juries must of necessity depend upon and accept the undisputed testimony of reputable specialists.
[T]here may be a legal obligation to take positive or affirmative steps to effect the rescue of a person who is helpless or in a situation of peril, when the one proceeded against is a master or invitor, or when the injury resulted from use of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant. Such an obligation may exist although the accident or original injury was cause by the negligence of the plaintiff or through that of a third person and without any fault on the part of the defendant.
Bell: Where defendant controls the instrumentality causing the injury, defendant has a duty to rescue. Special relationships that involve duty to rescue require the defendant to have actual ability and authority to control the third-person.
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has marked the distinction by defining conversion as: ". . . [A]n intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." Less serious interferences fall under the Restatement's definition of trespass [to chattels].
Page 87, Paragraph 5
The measure of damages in trespass in not the whole value of the property interfered with, but rather the actual diminution in its value caused by the interference.
Bell: There must be complete of very substantial deprivation of possession rights.
Where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of accident to the plaintiff and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened withotu the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect between the negligence and the injury.
When a group of defendants produce a substantial share of the market share of a drug, they may be held liable for harms resulting therefrom for their approximate portion of market share when the specific manufacturer is unknown.
Restatement § 46 makes a blanket provision for liability on the part of "one, who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another." Intention exists "when the act is done for the purpose of causing the distress or with knowledge . . . that severe emotional distress is substantially certain to be produced by [such] conduct."
Page 59, Paragraph 2Language must be likely to cause "severe emotional distress," not mere "emotional distress."
A violation of a statute or regulation constitutes negligence as a matter of law when the violation results in injury to a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the legislation and when the harm is of the kind which the statute or regulation was enacted to prevent.
[A] cause of action is established when it is shown that one, in the absence of any privilege, intentionally subjects another to the mental suffering incident to serious threats to his physical well-being, whether or not the threats are made under such circumstances as to constitute a technical assault.
An assault can be committed as long as the defendant "create[s] in the mind of the [plaintiff] a well-founded fear of an imminent battery coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt, if not prevented."