Civil Procedure II

Case Rules

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Cunningham

When the denial of one claim results in the plaintiff not getting the relief it claims to be entitled to, it has a right to be heard on appeal.

Anderson v. Bessemer City

  • FRCP 52(a)

    Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

  • Page 703

    Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.

    This is so even when the district court's findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.

Bias v. Advantage International, Inc.

  • Page 594, II.

    The Supreme Court has stated that the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 libellant. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The Supreme Court also explained that summary judgment is appropriate, no matter which party is the moving party, where a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. Thus, the moving party must explain its reasons for concluding that the record does not reveal any genuine issues of material fact, and must make a showing supporting its claims insofar as those claims involve issues on which it will bear the burden at trial.

    Once the moving party has carried its burden, the responsibility then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is, in fact, a genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court has directed that the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 libellant. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). The nonmoving party "must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In evaluating the nonmovant's proffer, a court must of course draw from the evidence all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 libellant. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).

  • Page 596, Last Paragraph

    In order to withstand a summary judgment motion once the moving party has made a prima facie showing to support its claims, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett

The moving party has the initial duty of production, then the respondent has a duty of production of evidence that there is a "genuine dispute as to a material fact."

Cohen v. Republic of Philippines

LexisNexis IconWestLaw LogoPage 91

Fed. respondent. Civ. plaintiff.. Rule 24(a)(2) allows anyone, upon timely application, to intervene in an action if:

The applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.


LexisNexis IconWestLaw LogoPage 91

Timeliness is a flexible determination made in the discretion of the Court. Among the factors to be considered in determining whether a motion to intervene is timely are

  1. how long the applicant knew of his interest before making the motion;
  2. prejudice to the existing parties from any such delay;
  3. Prejudice to applicant if the motion is denied;
  4. other unusual circumstances.

Frier v. City of Vandalia

Page 718, Bottom

One suit precludes a second "where the parties and the cause of action are identical." "Causes of action are identical where the evidence necessary to sustain a second verdict would sustain the first, i.e., where the causes of action are based upon a common core of operative facts."

Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith

  • Under full faith and credit, the federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have in a state court.

  • Justia LogoPage 663 (not in casebook)

    [A] state court judgment rendered in a matter over which the court had no subject matter jurisdiction is generally given no claim preclusive effect, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(c).

Harnden v. Jayco


[T]he court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.

Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Parks

Page 748

"[W]here a judgment may have been based upon either or any of two or more distinct facts, a party desiring to plead the judgment as an estoppel by verdict or finding upon the particular fact involved in a subsequent suit must show that it went upon that fact, or else the question will be open to a new contention. The estoppel of a judgment is only presumptively conclusive, when it appears that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter brought in question. It is necessary to look to the complete record to ascertain what was the question in issue."

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

Lind v. Schenley Industries

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59

Michaels Stores v. Castle Ridge Plaza Assocs.

  • See:

    FRCP 24
  • Page 363–364

    To intervene as of right, an applicant must meet four separate requirements. The application must be timely, the applicant must have an interest relating to the subject matter of the action, there must be a practical impairment of the applicant's ability to protect that interest, and the applicant's interest must not be adequately represented by the existing parties.

  • Page 364–365

    [A]n intervenor's interest in the action must be one that is significantly protectable. To be significantly protectable, the applicant's interest must be "a legal interest as distinguished from interests of a general and indefinite character." "The applicant must demonstrate that there is a tangible threat to a legally cognizable interest to have the right to intervene."

Mosley v. General Motors Corp.

Deprecated: ord(): Passing null to parameter #1 ($character) of type string is deprecated in /home/public/law/briefs.php on line 1314
  • Page 800, Top

    Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

    [(1) Plaintiffs. Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:

    1. they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
    2. any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.]

  • Pages 800–801

    Rule 20 [permits] all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties to be tried in a single proceeding. Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.

Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FRCP 24(a)(2) bases intervention as of right on:

  1. Whether the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action.
  2. Whether the claimants are so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede their ability to protect that interest.
  3. Whether their interest is not adequately represented by existing parties.

Pennsylvania Railroad v. Chamberlain

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)

Peralta v. Heights Medical Center

Yes, due process demands that a judgment be set aside for a lack of service.

Plant v. Blazer Financial Services

  • Page 791, Paragraph 2

    A permissive counterclaim must have an independent jurisdictional basis, while it is generally accepted that a compulsory counterclaim falls within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts even if it would ordinarily be a matter for state court consideration.

  • Page 791, Paragraph 4

    Rule 13(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that a counterclaim is compulsory if it "arises out of the transaction or occurrence" that is the subject matter of plaintiff's claim.

  • A claim and counterclaim arise from the same transaction when there is a logical relation between them.


    • Page 791, Bottom

      The logical relation test is a loose standard which permits "a broad realistic interpretation in the interest of avoiding a multiplicity of suits." "The hallmark of this approach is its flexibility."

    • Page 791, Bottom

      [A] "logical relationship" [exists] when the counterclaim arises from the same "aggregate of operative facts" in that the same operative facts serves as the basis of both claims or the aggregate core of facts upon which the claim rests activates additional legal rights, otherwise dormant, in the defendant.


    This is the majority rule.

Price v. CTB, Inc.

FRCP 14(a)(1)

A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it. . . .


Page 805

Even though it may arise out of the same general set of facts as the main claim, a third party claim will not be permitted when it is based upon a separate and independent claim. Rather, the third party liability must in some way be derivative of the original claim; a third party may be impleaded only when the original defendant is trying to pass all or part of the liability onto that third party.

Reid v. San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad

LexisNexis IconWestLaw LogoPage 639

[W]here the undisputed evidence of the plaintiff, from which the existence of an essential fact is ought to be inferred, points with equal force to two things, one of which renders the defendant liable and the other not, the plaintiff must fail.

Searle Bros. v. Searle

  • Page 690

    Collateral estoppel . . . prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit. This means that the plea of collateral estoppel can be asserted only against a party in the subsequent suit who was also a party or in privity with a party in the prior suit.

  • Page 691

    The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. This includes a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property. Our Court has said that as applied to judgments or decrees of court, privity means "one whose interest has been legally represented at the time."

Taylor v. Sturgell

Page 732, Paragraph 3

A party's representation of a nonparty is "adequate" for preclusion purposes only if, at a minimum:

  1. The interests of the nonparty and her representative are aligned; and
  2. either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty. In addition, adequate representation sometimes requires
  3. notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been represented. In the class-action context, these limitations are implemented by the procedural safeguards contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Temple v. Synthes Corp.

Page 814, Paragraph 3

[I]t is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit. . . . "a tortfeasor with the usual 'joint-and-several' liability is merely a permissive party to an action against another with like liability."

Tolan v. Cotton

At the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.