Trademark Law and Practice, Pages 157–161
In re Brunetti
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2017
Facts:
Appellant applied for a trademark that was a phonetic twin of a highly offensive word. It was often used with offensive imagery and words. Consistent with the Lanham Act, his trademark was denied for being immoral.
Procedural History:
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed.
Issue:
Is it constitutional for the government to prohibit immoral trademarks?
Reasoning:
- Content-based statutes are presumed to be invalid. The government has not proved that this statue furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve it.
- Because the offensive part of trademarks are expressive, not source-identifying, the prohibition targets expressive speech. This subjects it to strict scrutiny, which it undisputedly cannot survive.
- Even failing this, the prohibition does not survive the intermediate scrutiny that commercial speech restrictions are subject to. This comprises a four-part test:
- It admittedly concerns lawful, non-misleading activity.
- It does not concern a substantial government interest.
- The government does not have a substantial interest in promoting certain trademarks over others.
- Its interest in protecting the public from off-putting marks is not a substantial interest that would justify broad suppression of speech.
- The government does not have a substantial interest in protecting the public from the profane mark because registering it does not inherently foist it onto others nor make it more accessible to children.
- Even if it was a substantial interest, this does not directly prevent the applicants from using their marks unregistered.
- The inconsistency in the provision's enforcement makes it more extensive than needed regardless.
Holding:
No, it violates the First Amendment for the government to prohibit immoral trademarks. Reversed.